

R. S. PETERS' WORK ASSESSED
IN A NEW SCHEMA FOR
ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF EDUCATION

by

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R.S. Peters' Work Assessed

In A New Schema For Analysis

Of The Concept of Education

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ABSTRACT

The thesis begins with a presentation of a schema of five areas--concept of mind, reasons to be educated, what is to be learned, learning theory, and teaching theory--for the analysis of the concept of education. The writer argues that each of these areas is necessary, and that the logical connections of the schema as a whole must be considered, if there is to be any comprehensive and fruitful concept of education. It is not claimed that this list of areas is complete, but the writer does assert: that it provides a general schema by which to assess the scope and fruitfulness of assumptions and assertions on the concept of education; and that one's treatment of the different areas (the decisions one makes for each of the areas, for example, whether to adopt a dualistic position or not, whether to treat "education" as a value-laden term or not) should be logically consistent.

An analysis of the work of R. S. Peters is undertaken in which it is asserted that the core of his work is expressible in four general theses: the mind, mental development, criteria of education, and the 'impersonal public world.' These theses are analyzed according to the schema and it is shown that Professor Peters' analysis of education adheres rather closely to the schema. Also, it is shown that

Peters' overall treatment of the schema is consistent.

The writer's selection of the four theses is supported in that Peters' resolution of a long-standing educational conflict between the traditional/authoritarian and the progressive/child-centred schools of thought follows directly from the theses. It may be seen that, analyzed according to the schema, the conflicting schools of thought were deficient in that they adhered to some areas of the schema and de-emphasized others, and that those areas to which they did adhere were not the same. Further, it may be seen that Peters' ability to resolve the conflict stems directly from his own closer adherence to the schema.

The thesis concludes with some suggestions for further work with the schema, principally as an analytical tool in the comparative analysis of work on the concept of education

To

my 'other committee'

JL

And particularly for

SR

Nun ist das Heil....

CONTENTS

PREFACE	page ix
1 INTRODUCTION	
1 The scope and function of R. S. Peters' work in education	1
2 The problem of the thesis	1
3 The argument of the thesis	2
2 THE SCHEMA	
4 Areas of consideration	4
5 Priorities among the areas: the schema	6
6 The value of the schema	11
3 PETERS' THESES RE THE SPECIFIC CONCEPT OF EDUCATION	
7 Reduction of Peters' conclusions re the logic of education to four general theses	15
8 Peters' four theses	16
9 The benefit of Peters' concept of education: a corollary of the four theses	18
4 FIRST THESIS: MIND	
10 Peters' argument against Hobbes, Hull, and Skinner	19
11 The importance of concepts of knowledge,	

	<i>page</i>
action, intention, and social standard to Peters' view	22
 5 SECOND THESIS: MENTAL DEVELOPMENT	
12 Mind is regarded as a product of social development	26
13 Language as the vehicle of mental/social development	31
14 The way in which the initiation into language involves the teaching of traditions	35
15 'Really understanding' involves cognitive- affective connections	38
 6 THIRD THESIS: CRITERIA OF EDUCATION	
16 Three criteria for the educated person	45
17 Amplification of the criteria for the educated person	47
18 Peters' terminology in stating the criteria for the educated person remains problematic	51
19 Criteria for educational processes	52
20 Peters' distinction between educating and schooling	53
21 Education involves a sequence of transformations leading to a quality of life	55
 7 FOURTH THESIS: THE IMPERSONAL PUBLIC WORLD	
22 Peters' assertions re the impersonal	

	<i>page</i>
public world	57
23 The nature of the impersonal public world	60
8 A COROLLARY OF THE FOUR THESES: SYNTHESIS	
24 An opposition between progressive/child-centred and traditional/authoritarian models	63
25 A synthesis of these models involves the notion of public forms of experience as delineated in thesis four	69
9 CONCLUSIONS	
26 The status of Peters' concept of education	73
27 The status of the schema	74
28 Further work on the concept of education	75
WORKS CONSULTED	78

PREFACE

A number of works by Professor Peters were referred to and quoted in the text of the thesis. For ease of reference an abbreviated notation is used for each reference to indicate both the work referred to and the relevant page(s) within the work. For example, this quotation is referenced:

...the concept of 'character' should be one of the most indispensable terms in psychology. (PC, p. 267)

The reference is placed in parentheses at the end of the quotation. The work from which the quotation was taken has been notated 'PC'. This abbreviation is for the paper, "Moral Education and the Psychology of Character." The initials appearing in the abbreviation also feature prominently in the main title, so they can serve as a mnemonic device.

A list of the works by Peters together with their notations follows. For bibliographic information on these works, see WORKS CONSULTED.

AE "Aims of Education--A Conceptual Inquiry"

AP "The Autonomy of Prudence" written with A. P. Griffiths

ARE *Authority, Responsibility and Education*

- BR "In Defence of Bingo: A Rejoinder"
- CM *The Concept of Motivation*
- EE *Ethics and Education*
- EM "Education and the Educated Man"
- EaI *Education as Initiation* published as a pamphlet
- EI "Education as Initiation" EaI with slight changes
- EP "What is an Educational Process?"
- HD "Education and Human Development"
- LE *The Logic of Education* written with P. H. Hirst
- MA "Must an Educator Have an Aim?" Ch. 7 of ARE
- PC "Moral Education and the Psychology of Character"
- RH "Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education"
- RP "'A Recognizable Philosophy of Education': A Constructive Critique"
- TR "Teaching and Personal Relationships"
- WW "Worth-while Activities" Ch. 5 of EE

INTRODUCTION

1 The scope and function of R. S. Peters' work in education

R. S. Peters has produced almost a dozen and a half works between 1959 and 1971, dealing with social theory and psychology in education, ethics in education, and analytical philosophy as applied to education. His work embodies insights from several fields, all of them focused on educational theory. He introduces at least one major synthesis of previously conflicting doctrines (Ch. 8, A Corollary, see). While as yet there is very little critical material written about his work, it seems that most educational theorists and philosophers of education of the next few decades will need a clear understanding of his views.

2 The problem of the thesis

Peters' work as a whole is not always clear. He often assumes the reader's knowledge of his earlier works. He often calls upon technical language which the reader might be at a loss to understand from the context alone.

This thesis is in part an attempt to present a clear

understanding of Peters' work in education. The writer attempts (a) the clarification of the different basic areas and the relations between them (the "schema of areas" --as a shorthand form) which are required for a fruitful concept of education, (b) elaboration of Peters' four central theses on the concept of education, and (c) analysis of the relations between the schema and the four theses through exposition of the assumptions and assertions Peters makes within each area. Thus the concept of education is clarified by presenting a schema of associated areas such that the relevance of a number of research areas for education can be seen. The thesis investigates the logical underpinnings, as it were, of the concept of education, and in so doing it discovers some of what must be presupposed when talking about education.

3 The argument of the thesis

The thesis begins with a presentation of the different areas, consideration of which is necessary for a comprehensive and fruitful concept of education. It is not claimed that this list is complete, but the writer does assert that it provides a general schema by which to assess the scope and fruitfulness of assumptions and assertions about the concept of education, and it is shown that Peters' analysis of education fits the schema; and that one's treatment of the different areas should 'mesh' (be

consistent), and Peters' does. In elaborating this schema of areas and in presenting Peters' assumptions and assertions in each of these areas the writer is explicating one of the possible treatments of this schema. Some of these assumptions involve decisions as to what are the *key-concepts* in any one area, and some of his assertions involve claims as to what *states of affairs* obtain. The former are dependent on the key-concepts of their parent disciplines (e.g. sociology, psychology); the latter are dependent on investigations designed to confirm/disconfirm assertions made within the areas. Differing treatments of some of the areas can be expected to have determinable effects on the treatment of some other areas. (For example, a denial of the essential 'objectivity' of what is to be learned can be expected to have effects on what teaching methods are to be employed.) This amounts to saying that people may adopt differing sets of assumptions and assertions for the various areas. The thesis contains discussion of what the writer considers the most prominent and likely alternative treatments of the major areas, together with analyses of their effects on the constructing of a comprehensive concept of education. Finally, it is shown how Peters' assumptions and assertions as analyzed according to the 'schema' help resolve at least one long-standing educational problem.

THE SCHEMA

4 Areas of consideration

This section presents five general areas, consideration of which is required for a comprehensive and adequate concept of education. In the following sections the logical relations among these areas are displayed. The areas are:

(a) The concept of mind (CM)

Considerations relevant to a concept of mind are required in any comprehensive concept of education. However, the term "concept of mind" seems to imply a dualistic position, a distinction between mind and body, some kind of ontological status for minds. The writer wants to permit the possibility that non-dualists may have an adequate and fruitful concept of education. The area "CM" is concerned with *the nature of the learner*, and therefore in this area will come *all claims relevant to the existence of minds*.

(b) Learning theory (LT)

An extensive learning theory is ^{in the mind of the following} necessary. This ~~is to~~ include: theories descriptive of learning processes, including ~~(for non-dualists)~~ laws for stimulus-response

connection-making and other behaviour modifications, and (for dualists) *possibly* in addition sets of laws employing 'mentalistic' terminology displaying how knowledge, beliefs, emotions, intentions, etc. are acquired.

(c) Teaching theory (TT)

While learning theory is concerned with *how learning proceeds*, there must be a corresponding teaching theory concerned with how learning is to be *initiated and sustained*. This includes: theories descriptive of teaching processes, displaying the laws for initiating and for maintaining learning processes, rules for assessing results and comparing them to some standards, and (moral) rules specifying which practices are allowable and which are not allowable.

(d) What is to be learned (WL)

Consideration must also be given to whatever is to be learned. This includes *social rules* (ethical systems, legal systems, customs) and *objective standards* (rules for interpersonal appraisal). Selections are to be made from these for educational purposes according to some rules.

(e) Reasons for being educated (RE)

Considerations as to why education is to be recommended are required in any comprehensive concept of education. In

defining the term "education" we note that it is either a value-laden term or it is not a value-laden term. If one defines "education" in the second way then it is a *logical point* that the definition *cannot* give any recommendations. Therefore, if one wishes to recommend education, logically there *must* be an area "RE" to provide value-judgments. If "education" is defined as being value-laden, then a fact of language to be noted is that it is not *defined* as being undesirable. (Those who believe education to be undesirable equate it with what goes on in the schools, and so define "education" as not value-laden.) If "education" is defined as desirable, the¹¹, noting that it involves persons learning rules or skills, the weight of making value-judgments passes to the "WL" area.

5 *Priorities among the areas; the schema*

How are priorities among the five areas of considerations to be assigned? No educational consideration is more basic than a concept of mind; depending on whether a concept of mind is adopted, from purely psychological considerations, one will arrive at various theories of learning and of teaching. For example, an entirely behaviouristic position will have the effects on learning theory that 'mentalistic' language would be deleted, and in experiments data would be in terms of behaviour. A dualistic position effects the *possibility* of incorporating 'mentalistic' language into

learning theory. Given that *intentional* language may assume a new significance, investigations may involve giving different *kinds* of analysis for the same behaviour. (For example, He raised his arm (by intent) vs. His arm was raised (e.g. by the wind or by a physiological reflex). The resulting psychological laws could differ from the purely behavioural laws.

Whether a concept of mind is accepted will influence theories of teaching. As remarked, an entirely behaviouristic position would result in the deletion of 'mentalistic' language. Emphasis would be on the training and conditioning of responses to stimuli (verbal and other). Conduct and behaviour would be of the greatest importance. On the other hand, a dualistic position would lead to the *possibility* of incorporation of 'mentalistic' language. Teaching, given the possibility that intentional language may become important, could undergo a change of emphasis from the training and conditioning of conduct and behaviour to the instructing and/or indoctrinating in knowledge and beliefs.

Similarly, consideration of the reasons for being educated is fundamental; depending on which reasons are established, various decisions will be made as to what is to be learned, to teaching theory, and to learning theory.

If it is decided that education should be for purely pragmatic reasons then what is to be learned will be problem-solving, with emphasis on correct responses rather

than understanding *per se*, and on useful social rules. If education is to be purely for the furtherance of enjoyment then what is to be learned would be whatever each person enjoys whether it be studying *Principia Mathematica* or building sand castles. If education is to be sought because of some intrinsic value then the selection of what is to be learned must depend on the relative intrinsic worths of *possible* things to be learned, and the weight of decision-making passes to the area of what is to be learned.

The reasons for being educated also effect teaching theory. If the reasons are pragmatic then teaching theory is practically oriented and little theorizing need be done; practical results alone are of importance, correct behaviour is adequate, and no weight is given to understanding for understanding's sake. (For example, for a student who takes only *one* physics course and never has a use for the material again a teacher will orient the course toward coping with exams.) If the reasons for education are for the furtherance of enjoyment then what and how one teaches will be determined by what the learners wish. (For example, if life becomes less enjoyable from puzzling over *Principia Mathematica* then one has no obligation to investigate or to teach it.) If education is for reasons of intrinsic value then teachers do have obligations to investigate problems that are puzzling, provided intrinsic worth can be

attached to such investigations. It is probable also that education would become compulsory.

One's reasons for becoming educated also effect learning theory. If the reasons are pragmatic then learning theory restricts itself to research into how the practical uses of things are learned. If the reasons are for enjoyment then research is into how enjoyment is learned and furthered in respect of various subject matters. If education is for intrinsic value then whatever modes of experience are intrinsically worth while require to be taught.

Once what is to be learned has been decided on the basis of the previously chosen reasons for educating, then further matters in relation to teaching theory and learning theory are decidable without need to have recourse to further value judgments. The effects for teaching theory are as follows. If what is to be learned consists of disciplined studies as we understand them then there is the need to have explicated the appraisal rules for various disciplined studies. Note that what is accepted by any one discipline need not be true or false in the usual sense but it must be interpersonally appraisable. If what is to be learned are social rules (legal systems, ethical systems, customs) then there is the need to introduce the child into social rules.


Again, what is to be learned has an influence on learning theory. If disciplined studies are to be learned then

learning theory has to develop the means to ensure that the learner 'really understands'; learning theory must research to discover what are the ideally correct responses to test the adequacy of learning. It must ensure that full integration of new knowledge into the learner's world-view occurs. Research must be undertaken to discover ideally correct responses to test transference of what was learned, from the examples by which the pupils were taught to the domains where use of the general rules is intended. If what is to be learned are social rules then research must ensure the adequacy of learning of social rules--must ensure that correct rule-governed performances occur, that these performances will not be blocked by other performances, and that the learner is motivated to perform these correct performances. *about transference* *the learner is motivated*

Finally, there are interrelations between learning theory and teaching theory. If teaching is to proceed by ethically proper means then learning theory is required to show why these means are necessary and whether less ethical methods would have adverse effects on learning. Learning theory is also required to show the laws by which learning proceeds when guided by ethical teaching manner. If learning theory consists of descriptive theories of how learning occurs, lawful processes of learning, etc., then teaching theory is required to invent, formulate and test teaching theory and laws governing teaching processes so that

learning can begin and can proceed to desired ends. } *the end.*

The final schema appears like this:



In the figure the abbreviations are: CM--concept of mind; RE--reasons to be educated; LT--learning theory; WL--what is to be learned; TT--teaching theory. The arrows indicate the relations and priorities among the five areas.

6 *The value of the schema*

A schema of the sort developed in the previous section makes studies in education far more fruitful than would otherwise be the case. It may readily be seen that decisions in any one of the areas are both dependent on decisions already made in more basic areas and have dependent

upon them decisions in less basic areas. If prior or subsequent considerations are ignored then the applicability of research may be severely restricted and its value correspondingly reduced.

If the schema is correct then what is to be learned *must* be justified entirely in terms of either reasons to be educated, or (in the case that education is for reasons of intrinsic value) the relative intrinsic worth of what *might* be learned. Learning theory will be justified in terms jointly of the concept of mind, reasons to be educated, what is to be learned, and teaching theory. Teaching theory will be justified in terms jointly of learning theory, the concept of mind, reasons to be educated, and what is to be learned. Also, any recommendations and assertions in what is to be learned, learning theory, or teaching theory, even if not explicitly supported by reference to the more basic areas, may be interpreted as presupposing assertions and assumptions in the areas presupposed by each respectively.

It is possible for assertions in various areas to be inconsistent--such inconsistencies are the result of faulty reasoning either in the learning theory area, the what is to be learned area, or the teaching theory area. Provided the concept of mind and the reasons for being educated are in themselves adequately thought out they cannot themselves give rise to inconsistencies in what is to be learned, in

learning theory, or in teaching theory, for the concept of mind and reasons for being educated are not of the same logical type. Inconsistencies elsewhere in the schema may be due to the fact that assumptions and assertions of the same logical type 'descend' through the schema along different routes, giving rise to the possibility of modification of assumptions and assertions along one or other of the paths and at different stages. For example, assumptions and assertions to do with concept of mind can descend either directly to teaching theory or indirectly through learning theory to teaching theory. This gives rise to the possibility of modifications of the concept of mind during considerations of learning theory and thence possibly to a logical conflict between learning theory and concept of mind when considerations of teaching theory are begun.

Similarly, what is to be learned can be developed along lines which conflict with the reasons for being educated, with the result that teaching theory as it develops will be inconsistent either with the reasons for being educated, or with what is to be learned. Also, there is additional possibility of inconsistency since assertions concerning what is to be learned can travel either directly to teaching theory, or indirectly through learning theory, thus giving rise to the possibility of modification of what is to be learned during the development of learning theory, and hence, to inconsistencies at the level of teaching theory.

Analyses of inconsistencies in teaching theory are therefore rather complex. One may not be sure of having ruled out all possible conflicts until decisions within all areas have been made.

The schema clearly sets out where value judgments are usually made. Reasons for being educated are largely concerned with value judgments, as is what is to be learned when education is intrinsically valuable. Also, some value judgments are to be made in teaching theory in respect of what are the ethically proper manners of teaching. No other place for the making of value judgments occurs in an educational context. Value judgments are, of course, embedded in other considerations of what is to be learned, but these are to do with reasons for being educated and are not intrinsic to what is to be learned.

The schema also clearly indicates at what points other disciplines may be usefully consulted. For example, for the concept of mind one may consult psychology and philosophical psychology, and for reasons for being educated one must consult sociology to determine what a particular culture's reasons for being educated are in fact, and perhaps one should consult ethics to subject these reasons to a critique.

The schema is for a *concept* of education showing what areas must be considered, and some of the interrelations obtaining between these areas. The schema does not entail adoption of any particular theories or facts; it shows what *form* a concept of education ought to have to be fruitful.

PETERS' THESES
RE THE SPECIFIC CONCEPT 'EDUCATION'

*7 Reduction of Peters' conclusions re the logic of
education to four general theses*

For clarity of reference, the concept 'education' as delineated by Professor Peters I identify as *his* concept. I do not thereby enter the controversies whether Peters fabricated the concept or whether this is the *only* concept 'education,' and I do not imply anything whatever about its origins.

Peters' delineation of the concept 'education' produces a logical structure which, if we espouse it, both allows us to think and operate in particular ways when concerned with particular aspects of human life and limits our thought and operations in these concerns. The setting out of this structure is one aspect of concept-formation.

I have attempted to isolate a set of basic assumptions and assertions contained in Peters' work. I require that all be necessary to the understanding of his work, and that there be no serious logical overlappings between them. I do not insist that the set is complete. They form a logical core from which the concept 'education' emerges. Thus,

I assert that the logic of education, as understood by Peters, reduces to these elements. I have isolated four of them, and I call them the four theses of Peters.

If my delineation of four theses is correct then significant criticism about Peters' concept of education must centre on them, either singly or in combination. Each thesis embodies assumptions and assertions in one or more of the areas of consideration in my schema. The assertions can be questioned as to their truth/falsity, and the assumptions as to their utility, practicability, and so forth.

8 Peters' four theses

My concern in the chapters on Peters' theses (chs. 4-7) is to enable the reader to grasp the scope of the subject matter and the nature of the logical structure of education as conceived by Professor Peters, and to set his work within the 'schema' for assessment. This is a move towards clarification of an emerging concept of education, but my attempt is a beginning sketch only; it is a tool with which we may move toward an adequate concept of education.

Briefly, these are the theses:

(I) The 'Hobbes-Skinner-Hull' behaviouristic thesis in psychology is rejected. It is replaced by a dualistic thesis involving the everyday use of 'mentalistic' terminology. I have assigned Peters' first thesis to the concept of mind area on my schema.

(II) Minds are essentially the products of the learning of predominantly social rules. No human being is born with a mind. This is Peters' thesis on mental development, and so comes into the area of learning theory on my schema. Also, in describing mental development Peters elaborates his concept of mind. Thesis two, therefore, is lodged in the concept of mind area as well.

(III) The term "education" designates ethical criteria for educational processes, and criteria for 'the educated person.' The latter criteria entail an initiation into whatever is worth while involving knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth and which are not inert in the mind of the person who has been initiated into them. The criteria for educational processes come under the area of teaching theory on my schema, and the criteria for the educated person involve both the reasons for being educated and the what is to be learned areas.

(IV) An educational process is defined by Peters as being one in which the student learns both social rules (i.e. legal systems, the rules of etiquette, and generally assumed ethical principles in the society) and objective standards (i.e. the rules by which hypotheses may be interpersonally tested). He gradually enters and takes part in an 'objective and impersonal, public world' which is the human heritage.

9 *The benefit of Peters' concept of education: a corollary of the four theses*

Peters' theses--particularly thesis two (on human mental development) and thesis four (on the 'impersonal public world')--applied to educational theory create a synthesis which resolves previously existing conflicts between the progressive/child-centred theory of education and the traditional/authoritarian theory. This synthesis is presented as the central thesis of Peters' and Hirst's book *The Logic of Education*. I refer to this synthesis as a corollary of Peters' four theses. I mention this matter here only briefly to indicate the benefit of Peters' concept of education; the synthesis is described in detail later (ch. 8).

FIRST THESIS: MIND

10 *Peters' argument against Hobbes, Hull, and Skinner*

Peters' thesis about the nature of mind is outlined in detail in *Authority, Responsibility and Education* (Ch. 10) and in *Ethics and Education* (pp. 229-232). In these contexts he begins:

I want to discuss the tyranny of...a fashion. For my thesis is, roughly speaking, that the relationship between education and theories of learning has been largely misconceived--colosally misconceived. Far from it being the case that educationists have a lot to learn from the theory of learning, I want to suggest that the psychology of learning could benefit enormously from a study of the practice of education.

The fashion which I have in mind...dates back at least to the seventeenth century when Thomas Hobbes suggested that the behaviour of men could be explained in the same sort of way as the behaviour of bodies in motion. (ARE, pp. 119-120)

Peters objects to attempts to explain all human behaviour in terms of "mechanical laws of association which functioned as a parallel to the laws of gravity in the physical world" (ARE, p. 120).

His view is thus anti-mechanical in that he refuses to consider that human actions are--to use the classic example of physics--something like billiard balls which collide with one another and stop, move, or diverge in relatively simple and predictable patterns. He rejects the

considerations of Hobbes insofar as they support this view of human action. It is not the mechanical laws themselves to which Peters objects; it is the implication that human behaviour is *merely* the product of mechanical laws.

He also objects to:

...the tendency of American pragmatism and behaviourism...to assimilate thinking to doing, to regard it as 'surrogate behaviour'. (EI, p. 100)

The radical behaviourism of Hull and Skinner attempts to reduce the language and theories of 'the mind' to those of 'behaviour'. Again, there is the implication with radical behaviourism that human behaviour is *merely* the product of mechanico-physiological laws.

It is the attempt to apply these reductions to education to which Peters objects. He notes that these reductions may have the effect of making the learning of skills more important than the learning of ideas, and he argues against such reductions, appealing to the notion of an 'educated' man:

...an 'educated' man is distinguished not so much by what he does as by what he 'sees' or 'grasps'. If he does something very well, in which he has been trained, he must see this in perspective, as related to other things....For being educated involves 'knowing that' as well as 'knowing how'. (EI, pp. 100-101)

Peters' argument thus seems to be that 'mentalistic' language is required in education. His remark, quoted above, that the psychology of learning could benefit from a study

of educational practice suggests that, in his own schema, Peters makes a connection between educational practice and learning theory, with the influence moving (at least) *from* educational practice *to* learning theory. It is not entirely clear what aspects of educational practice are meant in his reference. If his 'educational practice' is equivalent to any or all of my 'teaching theory,' 'what is to be learned,' and 'reasons for being educated' then he does not diverge from my schema, for on my schema each of these areas influences learning theory.

It is clear that Peters groups Hobbes, Hull, and Skinner together, rejecting their joint approach to learning theory. He asks, rhetorically:

What then is so dotty about the Hobbes-Hull-Skinner approach? This is another way of asking what was valuable in the old conception of man as a rational animal. (ARE, p. 121)

Peters, therefore, is adopting a dualist position with full use of 'mentalistic' terminology--that seems to be what is implied when man is spoken of as being a "rational animal." There is a further suggestion that on Peters' schema there is a connection between 'educational practice' and 'the concept of mind', with the influence operating *from* 'educational practice' *to* 'the concept of mind.' My own schema does not make any connection like this; the closest my schema comes to this is in the connection between 'the concept of mind' and 'teaching theory', and

here the connection is *the reverse* of what Peters would make it. I have argued earlier (§5) that 'teaching theory' is not a 'basic' area; its final form is dependent on *all* the other areas. I also argued in the same place that 'the concept of mind' was a basic area. I think Peters is wrong, therefore, in suggesting that whether educators ought to accept a concept of mind should be dependent on educational practice. It *might* be plausible to argue that 'the concept of mind' is not basic after all; that 'reasons for being educated' is the only basic area, and that the influence is from 'reasons for being educated' to 'the concept of mind.' Such an argument would seem to be consistent with Peters' position. But I have not argued this way because *non-psychological* considerations--reasons for being educated, for example--do not seem to be relevant to the *purely* psychological matter of formulating or of arguing for or against a concept of the mind. It remains a question for research as to whether such an influence as that postulated from 'reasons for being educated' to 'the concept of mind' should be allowable.

11 *The importance of concepts of knowledge, action, intention, and social standard to Peters' view*

In developing a theory of the mind, Peters accords central places to notions of knowledge and action:

Man is a purposive, rule-following animal. He does not merely, like animals or machines, act *in accordance with* rules; he acts because of his *knowledge* of them. He forms intentions. We cannot bring out what we *mean* by a human action without reference to the ends which men seek and the plans and rules which they impose upon their seeking. Indeed most human ends are impossible even to describe without reference to social standards. (ARE, pp. 121-122)

Human *action* is not considered by Peters to be caused by mechanical processes; action is instead dependent on *knowledge* and on *intentions* formed in respect of knowledge. The concept of man as a rule-following animal is further developed in "Moral Education and the Psychology of Character" but the central thesis remains the same: a dualistic position is demanded, and 'mentalistic' terminology is required.

There appears at first glance to be a logical jump from the assertion that man is a rule-following animal to the assertion that description of human ends usually requires reference to *social standards*. The assertion that man is a rule-following animal requires that rules for interpersonal appraisal be available. Interpersonal appraisability in turn entails that there are standards of some sort. It is the *social* in "social standards" that is troublesome. In ordinary use the term "social standards" means something like 'the standards of society' or 'socially acceptable standards' and may be thought to refer to the fads and prejudices of the various social groupings. But "social" may also simply mean "interpersonal."

Presumably, Peters means this latter since he is talking about interpersonal appraisability and the former is much too restrictive for such a discussion. Thus Peters emphasizes the social/interpersonal nature--the essential objectivity--of any formulable rule. (See also thesis four: the impersonal public world.)

Peters' notion of man as a rule-following animal develops into an intricate set of assertions and metaphors which is used to describe and explain the development of rationality in the human mind. In effect he has proposed a model for thinking of human development. He regards his model as very superior:

For my model of the mind is, in an important sense, more than a model. Plato once said that philosophy was the soul's dialogue with itself. Similarly a person who has developed a legislative function, as I have called it, is a person who has taken the assessment of rules into his own mind. He has been initiated into a rational tradition stretching right back to Socrates. That is why the model of the educator as an artist producing an end product out of material or of the gardener tending a process of growth are both out of place. (PC, p. 286)

In calling his model "more than a model" he appears to mean three things. (a) His model does not draw on concepts from disciplines and practices which have no natural logical connection with education, such as art or gardening. Such models impose a structure on the concept of mind from 'outside' as it were, and are open to misunderstanding because the connection they have with the concept of mind is

by analogy only; certain similarities between what the artist does to his material and what the teacher does to the minds of his students *are assumed to be basic*. Peters challenges these assumptions (see Ch. 8 *infra*: synthesis) and so abandons such models. (b) The logical structure of his model has arisen naturally from 'inside' the matters with which he is concerned: the rational tradition, the taking of the assessment of rules into a person's own mind. His model is, therefore, more than simply an analogy for viewing education and the concept of mind. (c) Because of these two features his model is more 'in tune' with the materials it structures. It is more of a description of the mind which also serves as a partial explanation of it than an explanation of the mind in terms of something else. His model is therefore potentially far more fruitful than previous models.

SECOND THESIS: MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

12 *Mind is regarded as a product of social development*

Peters' thesis on mental development is presented largely in "Education as Initiation" and in *Ethics and Education*. There are brief notes elsewhere and one chapter specifically on *educational* development in *The Logic of Education*. In the present discussion he continues to develop his concept of mind, and elaborates the learning theory and teaching theory dependent jointly on the concept of mind and what is to be learned.

He begins,

...I propose to conceive of the mind of the individual as a focus of social rules and functions in relation to them. (PC, p. 274)

and continues: the "individual's character",

...represents his own distinctive style of rule-following. But it represents an emphasis, an individualized pattern, which is drawn from a public pool. Character-traits are internalized social rules such as honesty, punctuality, truthfulness, and selfishness. A person's character represents his own achievement, his own manner of imposing regulation on his inclinations. But the rules which he imposes are those into which he has been initiated since the dawn of his life as a social being. (EE, p. 57)

577
All human beings are social beings--this is a necessity

since whatever one was taught by human beings from birth onward was something already contained in the 'pool' available to one's culture or race. This pool is limited; it allows distinctive life-styles because humans may combine its elements in an indefinitely large number of ways. The number of such combinations is (one assumes) mathematically infinite. There are in the pool all the different rule-following patterns that have been developed in the past. Some patterns are incompatible with others; some may be combined with others in ways as yet untried or so far unsuccessful. While one can only *teach* that which is already available, what persons finally *learn* may not correspond to any previously developed rule or pattern, since persons do, after all, create *new* things.

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 (31)
 Peters continues more bluntly:

No man is born with a mind; for the development of mind marks a series of individual and racial achievements. A child is born with an awareness not as yet differentiated into beliefs, wants, and feelings.
 (EI, p. 102)

Mind is thus regarded as a social/interpersonal phenomenon.

In another context, after repeating the above points:

Indeed it is many months [after birth] before consciousness of his mother as an entity distinct from himself develops. His 'mind' is ruled perhaps by bizarre and formless wishes in which there is no picking out of objects, still less of 'sense data', in a framework of space and time, no notion of permanence or of continuity, no embryonic grasp of causal connection or means-ends relationships. The sequence of children's questions--'What is it?', 'Where is it?', 'When

did it happen?', 'Why did it happen?' mark the development of this categorial apparatus. The differentiation of modes of consciousness proceeds *pari passu* with the development of this mental structure. For they are all related to types of objects and relations in a public world. (EE, p. 49)

To assert "no man is born with a mind" seems, on the face of it, to classify infants together *logically* with the lower animals; that is, infants are not that *kind* of thing in respect of which one can apply 'mentalist' language. It is a very strong claim, and very difficult to defend. One implication of it is that even the "bizarre and formless wishes" that Peters notes in the above quotation, could not exist at all. They aren't indicative of much *development* but something is 'there' and this fact is tacitly acknowledged by Peters. If there were nothing 'there' then one ought to speak of the *creation* of minds and not, as we do, just of their development.

On the other hand, Peters' claim, if made weaker, would be less problematic. If by "mind" Peters means something like 'an adult-ish mind,' or 'a mind such as you or I attribute to one another' then matters stand differently and Peters' point is the simple and rather obvious one, that most of the 'contents' of our developed minds were learned. Thesis Two is in part an attempt to emphasize that pretty nearly the totality of what one eventually comes to understand, feel, think, and desire must be learned--and for better or for worse *is* learned.

However, children, being relatively uninitiated, *do have a peculiar status* according to Peters:

Children must now be seen as inhabiting a twilight world between man and the animal kingdom. Their minds operate very differently from those of adults and they only gradually emerge, stage by stage, to an adult form of experience. (LE, p. 30)

The terms "man" and perhaps "human being" are, it seems, to be restricted to a human 'animal' that has been through some learning processes and so has entered into what is called in thesis four "the impersonal public world" of social rules (see Ch. 7).

Peters' use of "adult" in the material just quoted is somewhat misleading; it suggests *physical* maturity, a condition that (presumably) occurs naturally given only minimal conditions. Peters' point appears to be that the term "adult" in his use is applicable only if the physical criteria are met *and* if certain criteria of social development are also met. An 'adult' for Peters, appears to be a person who has achieved an "adult form of experience." The 'emergence' into the "adult form of experience" is a matter of initiation and training.

It is not at all clear why Peters adopts a scale of human development with (apparently) 'animal' at the 'lowest' point--corresponding to 'youngest' age. I suggest this is a metaphor: children are seen as animal-like (in comparison with adults). Perhaps the metaphor is made strongly in this

way to make the point that the human race is a race of animals who have undergone a *purely social* evolution. If so, Peters is *also* assuming that each newborn child starts again at the bottom of the animal-to-human scale, and he appears to assume something like this.

The central problem with Peters' animal-to-human scale is that it may well be dis-continuous if it is shown that the difference between human and animal minds is a difference of *kind* and not solely one of *degree*. This is to suggest that what is being measured at one end of the scale may not be the same *kind* of thing as was measured at the other. These would therefore be two distinct scales *with no common points*. Strong cases have been made for the difference being one of kind; for example Jonathan Bennett, in *Rationality*, makes this case.¹ I suggest Peters' assumption is an exaggerated metaphor to make a point about the infantile nature of the young.

It would have been simpler for Peters to have suggested a scale on which 'infantile' was the lowest point. The same notions of human rational development could be developed. The problem of defending a metaphoric conception of childrens' nature could have been avoided. The problem about how to boost children over a (probable) category distinction at some--undetermined--place on the human-to-animal scale would have been avoided.

¹(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).

13 Language as the vehicle of mental/social development

The creation of "new things" takes place in life - what we may regard
 We may regard life as "a stream of experience to be enjoyed" or perhaps as "a series of predicaments to be lived through" (ARE, p. 93). There is a continuity of experience ^{in fact} in relation to which individual "centres of consciousness" (EI, p. 105) develop, are initiated, become educated or not, and which they either enjoy or endure. But experience is neither as fleeting as may be supposed, nor as private. The ways in which individuals have gone about experiencing and the interpretation of such experience or its results may be incorporated in language. Other individuals may, then, follow these incorporated rules for experiencing and interpreting, and so may experience and interpret for themselves in ways similar to those of their predecessors. The intent of education is to cause new individuals ^{to reach} to learn and integrate these incorporated rules *(what Montessori calls a "point of awareness" of)*

Thus, what is experienced is public in the sense that the way in which one sees the world is prepared by others and then brought forward as the social initiation one is to undergo. Peters judges that language is largely the vehicle for this initiation:

...one of the first things that children do is to learn a language. And in learning to speak correctly they also learn to pick out things and classify them in a way which it has taken men many centuries to acquire. Without social training children would

probably not learn to walk, let alone to talk. And the vast experience of our ancestors is incorporated in the language into which we are initiated at a very early stage. (ARE, p. 98)

Early child-hood development is no doubt complex. To suggest that learning to talk *in most of its aspects* requires social training is reasonable. It is doubtful whether the same applies to learning to walk. Children may well learn to walk by imitation and trial and error, and they may require help in balancing themselves, and so on; but none of the *technical* senses of "training" appear to apply: children are not 'drilled' in walking; nor are they 'instructed'; they are 'shown how' and 'aided.'

The language we are given is the fruit of much pain and work. Errors and stumblings of the past appear in the language for a while then are replaced as the errors are corrected and difficult ways made easier. In this way, by centuries of trial and error, "traditions, a history, and culture" (ARE, p. 97) develop.

The information so stored is essential for the continuance of civilization. The main function of the educator is to pass on this priceless human heritage. (ARE, p. 97)

The educator:

...is an inheritor of a way of life...defined in terms of procedures and principles which make it possible for assumptions and institutions to change in the light of growing knowledge and experience. He must hand on the wisdom of the past. But he must

also hand on procedures and an attitude of mind which permit truth to prevail and institutions to be adapted to changing conditions. (ARE, p. 105)

The educator does not merely hand on a body of *static* traditions. Among the traditions is, of course, that of empiricism:

It is the tradition which insists that other traditions should not be taken for granted until they have been subjected to the test of experience...and *shown* to be correct, the most colossal errors and injustices could be and have been perpetuated for generations. Indeed in the history of man, taken as a whole, the usual thing has been to pass on as unquestionable truths the assumptions of previous generations. The empiricist tradition, which insists that traditions must be criticized and examined, is a brittle crust on a mass of irrationality and self-perpetuating dogma. (ARE, p. 104)

All, or almost all, a person's thought, speech, responses, emotions, etc. are prepared and learned during his initiations. Here I extrapolate freely beyond what Peters has said in order to make the point. What ~~the educator is~~ doing with language in respect of the student is 'setting limits to thought' as Wittgenstein once asserted philosophers do with respect to already qualified speakers of the language.¹ The educator's function is just that of the philosopher, except that ~~the educator is~~ concerned with initiating the individual into public and available

¹Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, intro. Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961 [1921]), §§4.113 - 4.114.

forms of thought and awareness, rather than with the initiation of the mature speakers of the language into some higher state of awareness which ^Ihe alone currently enjoys.⁽¹⁾ Philosophers probe the limits of thought--the limits of the impersonal public world (see Ch. 7)--and by so doing work beyond what the ordinary person conceives as those limits. So the ^{teacher}educator speaks from beyond the limits as conceived by the naïve or the uninitiated, from a position beyond the limits of his pupils' (private) worlds, that is, from a position beyond their language. His task is to set wider limits on their thought by giving them access to new language. Wittgenstein makes a point which, if interpreted as being from the pupil's view, gives illumination:

5.6 *The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.*

5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.

So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.'

For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.

We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.

5.62

....

The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.¹

¹Ibid., §§5.6 - 5.62.

While a precise parallel between the educator and the philosopher is not defensible, the similarities are provocative.

Rules, of course, are alterable, and the child, initially interpreting rules as fixed, comes to realize this fact and develops toward what Peters calls the "autonomous stage" (ARE, p. 115; PC, p. 277; RH, p. 253) in which his mode of behaviour becomes "purposive rule-following" (ARE, pp. 132-134). Thus, provided the learning processes and experiences to which he was submitted and the manner of teaching are correct, he achieves the stage of "rational rule-following" (ARE, p. 135), and gains a "rational code" (PC, p. 275) to live by.

Thus, students must be introduced to (a) experiences of many different kinds, with the emphasis that ordinary 'first-hand experience' is required but that such experience has severe limitations when principles and abstractions have to be learned (ARE, pp. 99-103; EP, pp. 16-17; PC, p. 277), and (b) the social rules of the "public world" (see thesis four).

14 The way in which the initiation into language involves the teaching of traditions

The "public world" or "public heritage" into which the student is to be initiated has been "marked out" by preceding generations (AE, p. 13). What has been so 'marked out'--"impersonal content and procedures"--is "enshrined

in public traditions" (EI, p. 103), and "public traditions [are] enshrined in a public language" (EI, pp. 102-103). Also, the "public world [is] picked out by...language and concepts...and structured by rules governing... purposes and interactions" (AE, p. 13).

Mere linguistic fluency is therefore not what is intended when the educator gives the students access to a new language. The teacher must also communicate the traditions which it enshrines. Language--as a sophisticated sign-system--can take many forms: music, colour, body gestures (e.g. ballet), and so on; it is not restricted to any one or two perceptual media such as visual or aural stimulation as its carrier. Language is not merely a self-contained system that can be 'disconnected' as it were, from the world; it is an *interpreted* sign-system that takes meaning both from the interconnections it makes within itself, and from the mass of interpretative rules and applications in which it is used.

There are at least two ways in which traditions may be embodied in language, (and here again I extrapolate from Peters). (a) Language may be used to *state* traditions as *matters of fact*. For example, 'We have a tradition of critical thought,' or 'Tragedy is part of our theatrico-literary tradition.' The listener's attention is directed to certain facts as stated, to logical relations among terms *s/he* already knows. In order to understand *s/he* need not go

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out to look at the world. However, this latter fact is precisely the limitation of *statements of fact*: there is the danger of rote memorization, the danger that the student will leave the facts as they are and not realize further that they are an interpretation of the world.

(b) Language may *express (implicitly) ways of understanding*. The ways of understanding may be learned during the following of directives. For example, 'Ensure that any assertions you may make are in principle confirmable/disconfirmable' is a statement embodying part of a critico-scientific tradition. The ^{student} listener is directed to act in certain ways; ~~he~~ is not told why ~~he~~ ought to do so in the context of following the tradition. The statement is therefore not descriptive of what the tradition is; the statement *expresses* or *exemplifies* the tradition, *shows* what is to be done or how something is to be thought. Language may also manifest traditions by means of the way in which describing is done. For example, traditions of racial prejudice are exemplified if an Afro-American is referred to as a 'nigger.' Again, the tradition is *shown*, not *stated*. (A *statement* of the tradition would be, 'For decades the term "nigger" has been used to represent Afro-Americans as in most ways inferior to Whites.')

What occurs in the learning of a tradition-^{START}implying language is that attitudes and interpretations are 'picked up' relatively uncritically at the time. It appears that

a great deal of the learning of public traditions is contained in this learning of attitudes and ways of seeing. The two forms of embodying traditions, stating and showing, are themselves representatives of traditions; the first is conducive to isolating assertions re matters of fact so that their truth/falsity can be determined subsequently; the second relatively more conducive to inculcating attitudes.

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15 'Really understanding' involves cognitive-affective connections

Initiation into the public world involves knowledge and understanding. It has not only a 'cognitive' but also an 'affective' side to it--a 'feeling side' to it. (EE, pp. 146-147). 'Really understanding' something involves becoming *committed* to rules and standards, i.e. involves an emotional development of sorts.

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Peters claims,

Wood. a strong case can be made for Socrates' view that if a man does not pursue or at least feel drawn toward what is good then he does not really understand it: (EE, p. 146)

The point, says Peters, is once a person learns a particular concept or becomes a participant in a way of life the "standards" or procedures and attitudes "built into" it take over, so that one *lives* and does not merely talk about or pay lip-service to the concept or way of life. One has become

committed to it. ⁻¹
 (200 10 42)

This is not to say that the educated person is irrevocably committed to every rule he has learned. Some of what he learns may be effective such that other things are rejected. He may even revolt against his culture without 'losing' his education, concludes Peters after a discussion with W. H. Dray. Peters has argued that the educated person must be committed to some standards, and Dray, using the example of St. Paul who underwent 'religious conversion' on the road to Damascus, asks whether one might say correctly that the man who gives up his culture, most of his traditions, who has overthrown his background has *lost his education* (AE, p. 22).

Peters' response implies that Saul, by discovering himself confronted with the blinding light and with the voice coming out of it, has lost certain commitments, but *only by already having other commitments* which he did not (ever, so far as we know) reject. It is at least plausible to say that these other commitments were commitments to believe that what he 'saw with his own eyes' or 'heard with his own ears' represented fact and not fiction, commitments to acknowledge that certain persons had *claimed* one could have 'religious experiences' which would have a strong emotional and perhaps physical impact on him, commitments to acknowledge that these same persons in their 'descriptions' of their 'religious experiences' used language much like

the language he is tempted to use to describe his confrontation with the blinding light and the voice, and commitments to normal critical evaluations in the face of apparent paradoxes (there was a voice but there was no man there). In the face of what he 'sees' and 'hears' and of his prior commitments as described, he cannot sustain his commitment to *dis*-believe religious claims: he becomes 'converted' so that he is now committed to a religious mode of thought.

The man is still cultured, presumably, and still competent to run his own life; only one set of commitments has changed (and, of course, what he then considered important changed, and so on). He can give reasons (as above) for the change. (Whether we, two thousand years later, would call them adequate reasons is irrelevant.) In amending his rules to account for what he now believed to be the case, what he was doing was more like *substituting* what were to his mind rules more consistent with actual experience, than like giving something up.

Dray's point referred specifically to whether the Jews would challenge his claim to be educated. Peters answers:

...I am not sure. It would depend on the extent to which they believed in indoctrination, with the rigid insistence on an unshakable *content* of belief that goes with it. (AE, p. 26)

Peters' point is, I infer, that if Saul/St. Paul could have made a valid claim to be educated *before* conversion, then conversion does not affect the status of the claim, and,

Peters would add, if the Jews believed strongly in indoctrination then their contest of Saul's/St. Paul's claim to be educated *after* conversion only indicated that what they understood was indoctrination, not education (AE, p. 26).

In order to *be* educated, one must be committed to a great many rules from which one infers what one ought to expect and ought not to expect. Normally, it would seem that these form a consistent set, so that the inferences do not logically contradict each other. Even so, what one infers on the basis of *current* experience may be counter-expectational (as in Saul's/St. Paul's case). In such a case one either rejects the current inference or rejects the rule(s) by which the current inference is judged counter-expectational. Thus, in confrontation with the 'test of experience' one's available rules maintain themselves, through change, in a kind of equilibrium. One *could* thus express *lack* of education in not changing.

Nelson Goodman, in *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*, expresses how these rules and inferences interrelate with each other:

*A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend.*¹

Saul, confronted with an experience which conflicted with

¹Nelson Goodman, *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*, 2nd ed, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), p. 64.

the experiences he would normally infer, could have done one of two things: either (a) reject the inference that he must be having a religious experience (maybe it was a hoax), or (b) reject the rule by which he had inferred the impossibility of religious experience. On the basis of the traditions into which he had been initiated, and his subsequent development in them, he chose (b). Little more can be said in view of the paucity of evidence and reports from the time.

learning language then, involves
~~In summary, learning involving knowledge and understanding~~ *but* also entails commitment; ~~but~~ *however,* commitments can change, even radically, without the status of one's claim to be educated being affected. *(Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast)* In learning how to speak and think in various ways *a student* one becomes committed to these modes of thought and speech, and thereby committed to the standards incorporated in them, whether these standards represent traditions of critical thought, racial prejudice, or whatever. In using *language as a way* 'ways' of speaking and thinking, *a student* one evokes from the environment responses, and depending on what these are and how *she* one understands them *she* one will experience various emotions, modify various commitments, and so on. This appears to be what Peters has meant. For example,

have
 Peters has this to say about emotions:

We talk more naturally of 'educating the emotions', than we do of training them. This is surely because the distinct emotions are differentiated by their cognitive core, by the different beliefs that go with them. The fundamental difference, for instance,

between what is meant by 'anger' as distinct from 'jealousy' can only be brought out by reference to the different sorts of beliefs that the individual has about the people and situations with which he is confronted. A man who is jealous must think that someone else has something to which he is entitled; what comes over him when he is subject to a fit of jealousy is intimately connected with this belief. But a man who is angry need have no belief as specific as this; he may just regard someone as frustrating one of his purposes. (EI, p. 98)

Thus, according to ^(changed) Peters, there is an inseparable *logical* connection between what is ordinarily referred to as thought (the cognitive aspect of knowledge and understanding) and emotion (the affective aspect), in the language and traditions one has learned.

Peters asserts that since this cognitive-affective relation is a *logical* relation, current classifications of 'development' which rely on distinctions between 'intellectual,' 'social,' and 'emotional' development are therefore indefensible (LE, pp. 49-51). Learning a language, learning to understand what there is, learning to interpret it, and finding oneself committed, are all part of coming to "really understand" what things are.

In conclusion, a few remarks on correlations between Peters' discussions and my own schema are appropriate. Mentalistic language certainly is incorporated into Peters' discussions of learning theory. This incorporation was made possible by the dualistic position he adopted; it was made mandatory by the use of mentalistic terminology in another basic area that influences learning theory: the

reasons to be educated (at least). Similarly, Peters' references suggest that what is to be learned has a strong influence on learning theory. What is to be learned appears to be both disciplined studies and social rules (objective standards and social rules). Following from the requirement for disciplined studies there are discussions (as required by my schema--see *supra*, p. 10) of what it means to 'really understand.' There is not, however, much discussion on the meaning of "social rules" on on their status in learning theory, to correspond with the requirement that social rules be taught. The nature of 'rules' themselves and their function in the mind of the learner are detailed rather broadly. Peters' task was not, apparently, to construct learning theory, but to distinguish a number of the factors that influence it, and to indicate something of their structure.

THIRD THESIS: CRITERIA OF EDUCATION

16 *Three criteria for the educated person*

Professor Peters' treatment of educational criteria is spread throughout his work. The works: "What is an Educational Process?", "Aims of Education", "Education as Initiation", and *Ethics and Education* contain extensive and similar accounts. The criteria here fit into my own schema as criteria governing the what is to be learned area, and the relations of that area within the schema. Peters summarizes his criteria for the educated person:

- (i) An educated man is one whose form of life--as exhibited in his conduct, the activities to which he is committed, his judgments and feelings--is thought to be desirable.
- (ii) Whatever he is trained to do he must have knowledge, not just knack, and an understanding of principles. His form of life must also exhibit some mastery of forms of thought and awareness which are not harnessed purely to utilitarian or vocational purposes or completely confined to one mode.
- (iii) His knowledge and understanding must not be inert either in the sense that they make no difference to his general view of the world, his actions within it and reactions to it or in the sense that they involve no concern for the standards immanent in forms of thought and awareness, as well as the ability to attain them. (EP, p. 9)

Re (i): the educator (this is here a general term used

to cover parents, teachers, and so on) must take care that the general state of the developing person is moving on desirable lines. It must be remembered that one's general state, one's feelings, one's commitments, and so forth are all considered to be learned (see thesis two). If they were not learned correctly, if what was learned was not desirable, then the term "educated" does not apply to that person.

Re (ii): educational development is seen as a species of development of the human mind. It is not so much concerned with what one can *do* but with whether one develops into a 'rational rule-following' being. To be educated does not imply that one does not or that one cannot work for a living, but it rules out the possibility that one's life is *predominantly* a matter of working for a living.

Re (iii): the educator must ensure that what is learned functions adequately within the general context of whatever else the student has learned, that is, it must influence the student's "general view of the world" and what he does in it. Elsewhere Peters refers to this learning as the developing of "cognitive perspective" (EE, p. 45). Indeed, if the 'worth while' development described in (i) is to be ensured the learning of new things must have these effects, required by Peters, that one's general view of the world changes, and that one becomes committed to certain things and standards rather than others. Naturally enough, these standards are the rules representing the

traditions implicit in the language one learns.

Criterion (iii) also cautions that teaching theory and learning theory *must* ensure the meeting of the goals of reasons to be educated and what is to be learned. There have been tendencies in the schools to ignore these requirements, to teach 'facts' without understanding: learning is by rote only. What was learned can be used pragmatically, say in the writing of exams, but it tends to have little lasting influence; it does not change the learner's views, the learner's commitments are not modified in respect of it. It is, Peters would say, inert, and is worthless as a contribution to the development indicated in (i).

17 Amplification of the criteria for the educated person

So far the criteria for the educated person remain somewhat vague. Peters provides some additional amplification. For example, amplifying (i): education "has to be described as initiation into activities or modes of thought and conduct that are worth while" (EE, p. 55), an educated person must have achieved some desirable state of mind (EP, p. 5; EI, pp. 90-91), or valuable states of mind (LE, p. 13). Combining (i) and (ii): there must be "desirable states in a person involving knowledge and understanding" (LE, p. 40). Amplifying (ii): the educated person must have "some understanding of the 'reason why' of things"

(AE, p. 7); must have breadth as well as depth, and must not be narrowly specialized (AE, p. 7), must have an all-round type of development (EP, p. 7) involving various forms of awareness (AE, p. 7). Amplifying (iii): the educated person must have his "outlook...transformed by what he knows" (EP, p. 7), so that living becomes "a quality of life" (AE, p. 8); must have attitudes involving "the commitment which comes through being on the inside of a form of thought and awareness" (EP, p. 8).

Again it is emphasized that the educational development is mental development, involving a general introduction into broad classes of experience and of methods of thinking and interpreting experience. The development is regarded as valuable, but it is not to be mistaken for what 'the masses' find popular. The various forms of thought and awareness each have internal standards including standards of worth in relation to the various experiences which are their subject matters. In learning these forms one finds that 'mass-values' rapidly cease to have relevance, being based as they are on relatively minimal and often incorrect initiation into advanced forms. These advanced standards of value are embodied in critical traditions whose functions generally are the continued assessment and reassessment of thought, experience, and attitude. It is this continued assessment and reassessment which, becoming a part of one's life enforces changes in outlook and the attainment of a life of quality.

In assessing what is to be learned the educator is, therefore, to assess the relative worthwhileness of the various matters which he *might* teach. In *Ethics and Education* (Ch. V) Peters makes a strong case for the claim that what is to be learned be selected on the basis of its *intrinsic value*. He argues:

...considerations must derive from the nature of the activities themselves and the possible relations between them within a coherent pattern of life.
(EE, p. 155)

In arguing for "science, history, literary appreciation, philosophy, and other such cultural activities" (EE, p. 160) as subjects of sufficient intrinsic worth to be taught as part of an education, Peters claims that they interrelate with each other, modify each other, illuminate each other, and mutually ensure the transformations toward a life of quality:

They can be, and to a large extent are, pursued for the sake of values intrinsic to them rather than for the sake of extrinsic ends. But their cognitive concerns and far-ranging cognitive content give them a value denied to other more circumscribed activities which leads us to call them serious pursuits. They are 'serious' and cannot be considered merely as if they were particularly delectable pastimes, because they consist largely in the explanation, assessment, and illumination of the different facets of life. They thus insensibly change a man's view of the world. ...A person who has pursued them systematically develops conceptual schemes and forms of appraisal which transform everything else that he does. (EE, p. 160)

The very question 'Why do this rather than that?' which Peters asks as a start to selecting what is worth while,

cannot properly be answered without consideration of these activities, for they are *instrumental* to answering it (EE, p. 163)--and for that reason at least ought to be taught. But that is not all; the disciplined activities change the formulation of the question "by transforming how 'this' and 'that' are conceived"; the disciplined activities are "built into asking the question as well as into answering it" (EE, pp. 163-164). Peters concludes:

In brief the justification of such activities is not purely instrumental because they are involved in *asking* the question 'Why do this rather than that?', as well as in answering it. (EE, p. 164)

Note that on the schema (*supra*, pp. 7-8) the area what is to be learned takes the weight of the assessment and selection of what is to be learned, As I showed, this situation would come about if education is to be sought because of some intrinsic value. It is likely, therefore, that Peters' reasons for being educated are of this form--at least they deny *purely* instrumental reasons. Peters argues that the having or gaining of a "passionate concern for truth" (EE, p. 165) is a good reason to be educated. About this attitude toward truth, Peters says in conclusion:

Such an attitude is surely in some way called forth by man's predicament as a thinking being in a universe whose local conditions have made thinking possible. The teacher helps to awaken an awareness of the manifold aspects of this predicament; he indicates in some way how things are and the appropriateness of conducting life on the basis of such considerations. (EE, p. 166)

18 *Peters' terminology in stating the criteria for the educated person remains problematic*

Attempts to understand the terminology in which Peters states his criteria and amplifications become at times frustrating. Little of the terminology is clearly explained at its first use, so that unless one already has a broad background in, for example, social theory and psychology one may often be unable to determine what experiences are designated or how they are to be thought and evaluated. The following terms remain vague: "cognitive perspective," "forms of thought and awareness," "*standards immanent in forms...*," "*mode* [of thought and awareness]," "commitment," "to be *inside* a form...," "state of mind," "outlook is transformed," "form of life," "all-round development." There is also talk of "public modes of experience" (LE, p. 52) and "modes of knowledge and experience" which are also referred to as "domains" (LE, pp. 62-66). These 'forms,' 'modes,' or 'domains' are said to constitute the "inheritance into which children are to be initiated" (EI, p. 103); they are the "public traditions enshrined in a public language" (EI, pp. 102-103).

Apparently the 'forms,' 'modes,' and 'domains' of 'knowledge and experience' or of 'thought and awareness' are all the same sort of thing. Science, morals, history, and aesthetics (EP, p. 20), together with mathematics, politics (LE, p. 12), and interpersonal knowledge (LE, p. 63),

criticism
of
Peters
terminology

and possibly religion and philosophy (EP, p. 8; EE, pp. 161-164) exemplify these 'forms.'

My analysis of Peters' assumptions and assertions in the context of the schema has made this terminology much more intelligible. However, these terms still need considerable clarification.

19 *Criteria for educational processes*

The criteria for the what is to be learned area have influences on the teaching theory and learning theory areas. Obviously enough, the teacher has to ensure that what is to be learned *is* learned, that, for example, what is learned now will not block the learning of what is to be learned next, and that the 'interpersonal appraisal rules' for the various disciplines are explicated and available (see *supra*, pp. 9-10). Specifically, the educator must ensure that the three criteria for the educated person (*supra*, p. 45) are met. This necessitates,

that 'education' at least rules out some procedures of transmission, on the grounds that they lack wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner. (EE, p. 45)

This criterion indicates, in a negative way, features which allow decisions as to whether ongoing processes are educational or not. If the child lacks wittingness then he does not gain knowledge; if he lacks voluntariness then he does not learn to be a participant in the activities.

In general, given that there are processes and activities such as 'training,' 'lecturing,' 'instructing,' and 'drilling,' whether they are *educational* processes or not depends on whether they satisfy the criteria of education (EP, pp. 1-2; EI, pp. 92, 100). Peters believes it essential that the worthwhile states of mind which characterize the educated person are transmitted by "morally unobjectionable" means (EP, p. 9), that teachers operate according to "principles such as fairness, freedom and respect for children" if they wish to be called educators (LE, p. 15; similarly EE, pp. 35, 92). Peters is also "averse to indoctrination and conditioning" as methods of education (LE, pp. 40-41). Conditioning is rejected because it does not result in knowledge and understanding, but only in the modification of behaviour (EP, pp. 12-14). Conditioning emphasizes behaviour in accordance with rules, but not action based on knowledge of them. Indoctrination is rejected because its outcome is contrary to the development of critical thought (EP, p. 19). When Peters and Hirst, in *The Logic of Education* assert "that a definite moral point of view is implicit in their [Peters' and Hirst's] approach" (LE, p. 41) it is with reference to principles such as these.

20 *Peters' distinction between educating and schooling*

Given that education involves both a cognitive and an

affective development (see *supra*, §15) and that education therefore entails some kind of 'total mental development,' one might begin criticism by saying that, given what occurs in most schoolrooms, the 'emotional' and 'social' aspects of this 'development' are in fact distinguished and are largely ignored in favour of 'intellectual development.' By being largely *ignored* this development may, however, continue in undesirable directions despite the teacher's intentions; students may acquire some of the mannerisms, expressions, and unstated but strongly felt emotions the teacher may have. Peters would probably respond that what was going on was poor education, and that even if the teacher eliminated his biases from the teaching-learning situation and put his energies *only* into his teaching, the education given would be incomplete. But, Peters would add, it is not necessary that the criteria for adequate *schooling* be directly dependent on the criteria for an adequate education.

One must distinguish between educating and schooling, and one must decide what has place in the schoolroom and what has not. Peters suggests that what must go on under the heading 'schooling' need not always be educational--for example, vocational training and 'health' instruction (EP, p. 22, n. 2). This does not imply that such schooling meets or needs to meet all the criteria of education. One's emotional development in the area of interpersonal

relations (to use one of the 'forms of thought and awareness') may, for example, be excluded from schooling, while always (presumably) being included in education. Peters, however, very rarely talks about this kind of emotional development.

21 Education involves a sequence of transformations leading to a quality of life

Having been initiated into the worth while forms, and having gained desirable states of mind, one now is educated. But to be educated/initiated is not to have achieved an end beyond which there is no further learning or transformation, for the forms do not transform one's life toward any particular end. They initiate a sequence of *ongoing transformations* which is never ending because whatever can be experienced is subject to explanation, justification, exploration, and to *re-experiencing* in different ways due to modifications on mental structure imposed by explanation, justification, and exploration. Experience changes qualitatively.

The public forms themselves evolve as the quality of explanation, justification, and exploration changes, so that in this respect not only does one gain the wisdom and skill to find different answers to one's questions, but the re-interpretation of experience leads to re-formulation of one's questions so that in fact different

questions are asked (EE, pp. 163-164). Life becomes a never-ending challenge of transformations to be undergone in accord with new understandings gained about what is worth while and new capabilities reached in operating more fully and adequately in the various forms of thought and awareness. *There can be no one achievement that is called an 'aim' of education or "being educated."* Rather, one is, relative to other persons and existing standards, only more or less educated, well or poorly educated; one engages in more or fewer worth while activities, for better or poorer reasons. Peters' summarizing comment is, "To be educated is not to have arrived; it is to travel with a different view" (EP, p. 8; EI, p. 110; AE, p. 7). Put in other words, the educated person is changed, his capacity for change and for reinterpreting experience is increased, his life is more worth while through his changes. His life becomes a search for what is worth while and for the ways of integrating this worth into himself. And so he achieves a quality of life.

FOURTH THESIS: THE IMPERSONAL PUBLIC WORLD

22 Peters' assertions re the impersonal public world

Professor Peters regards education as a very general and unspecific (although rigorous) initiation (EP, p. 7) into "a common world" (EI, p. 105; EP, p. 21), a "selective world of social artifice" (EE, p. 52), "a public world picked out by...language and concepts...and structured by rules governing...purposes and interactions" (AE, p. 13), "public traditions enshrined in a public language" (EI, pp. 102-103), "impersonal content and procedures...enshrined in public traditions" (EI, p. 103), "public and differentiated modes of thought" (EI, p. 103), "public forms of thought and awareness" (EP, p. 20), "a public form of life" (AE, p. 13).

Teacher and pupil participate in "the shared experience of exploring a common world." The teacher is "more familiar with its contours and more skilled in handling the tools for laying bare its mysteries and appraising its nuances" (EI, pp. 104-105; similarly, EE, p. 53). Peters speaks of "forms of objective experience" and "related qualities of mind" that:

...have only become possible to us through the progressive elaboration of complex linguistic structures, social institutions, and traditions, built up over thousands of years. (LE, p. 77)

These become open to us "only by mastery of the complex non-natural world in which they are embedded" (LE, p. 77).

In conversation between persons "the point is to create a common world to which all bring their distinctive contributions...participating in...a shared experience" (EP, p. 21). In personal relationships people "build up a common world which they share together," a world constituted by "their shared experiences," by "the common stock of knowledge which has developed" in the relationship, and by "the details of the private worlds that intersect on such occasions" (LE, p. 94). Several persons may "contribute their private experience to a common pool in order to arrive at a better understanding" (LE, pp. 94-95).

The teacher helps students "to explore and *share* a public world whose contours have been marked out by generations which have preceeded both of them"; it is a "public heritage" (AE, p. 13). This exploration is done "in accordance with rigorous canons" (EI, p. 105; EE, p. 58). To be initiated into "distinctive forms of knowledge....with the canons implicit in all these inherited traditions" is to have a door opened to "a vaster and more variegated inheritance" than is otherwise possible (EI, p. 103). And,

...for all who get on the inside of such a form of thought and who make it, to a certain extent their own, the contours of the public world are to that extent transformed. (EE, p. 51)

Education, also,

...consists essentially in the initiation of others into a public world picked out by the language and concepts of a people and in encouraging others to join in exploring realms marked out by more differentiated forms of awareness. (EE, p. 52)

This is a world of *consciousness*. Peters asserts:

The objects of consciousness are...objects in a public world that are marked out and differentiated by a public language....The learning of language and the discovery of a public world of objects in space and time proceed together...the individual...represents a particular and unrepeatable viewpoint on this public world....each one mirrors the world from a particular point of view....as he develops, he adds his contribution to the public world. His consciousness, as well as his individuality, is neither intelligible nor genetically explicable without the public world of which he is conscious, in relation to which he develops, and on which he imprints his own individual style and pattern of being. (EE, p. 50)

It is an "amorphous world" wherein:

...there may well be a few natural objects, such as the mother's breast, that all children pick out as primordial patterns. But most of the objects explored are put there for a purpose and have the imprint of the public mind upon them. The human world, even at this level of concrete objects, is largely a selective world of social artifice. (EE, p. 52)

A people's language functions to:

...pick out and create the public world peculiar to them. The...man...who has access only to a limited vocabulary and to a limited set of symbolic structures, literally lives in a different world from the ...man who has a much wider and more varied vocabulary.... (EE, pp. 52-53)

We have "purposes, standards, feelings, and beliefs", and "in a language is distilled a view of the world which is constituted by them" (EE, p. 53). A relationship between exploring this 'world' and learning a language is suggested:

...to manipulate numbers and to see relationships between them is to begin the exploration of a special world, to learn a new sort of language. (EE, p. 53)

And, an individual's character, as has been mentioned:

...represents an emphasis, an individualized pattern, which is drawn from a public pool. Character-traits are internalized social rules. (EE, p. 57)

23 *The nature of the impersonal public world*

Thus, this 'world' is a world of rules for interpersonal appraisal and traditions, and insofar as such things are interpersonally appraisable, it is also a world of purposes, standards, feelings, beliefs, language, and concepts. The disciplines of knowledge and understanding are also part of this world. And the world develops as these forms for interpersonal appraisability evolve. It is a world as perceived by individual centres of consciousness, or 'minds', and its theoretical existence requires dualism and mentalistic language. (I do not assert, and I do not believe Peters intends that the 'impersonal public world' is equivalent to

what we commonly refer to as the 'real world.')

Different individuals, each with a unique history, have *different perspectives on that world* (EP, p. 21, etc.). Peters has also spoken of "private worlds" (e.g. LE, p. 94) and of attempts between individuals to create "a common world" (EP, p. 21). While speaking of the differences between working-class and professional persons, Peters asserts that they live in *different worlds* by virtue of the language and concepts available to each (EE, pp. 52-53). Differences in a person's 'symbolic structures' are correlated closely with differences in vocabulary (EE, pp. 52-53). The Wittgensteinian 'logical world' already referred to in the context of mental development (*supra*, pp. 33-35) is recalled now. Each person has a private or personal world logically limited by the boundaries of the language available to him. The combination of all that is interpersonally appraisable in these private/personal worlds is what defines the public world. Clearly, each person by virtue of his unique private/personal world finds him or herself in a particular relationship with that confluence of personal worlds--the public world. This relationship is referred to by saying that each person has his or her own *perspective* on that 'world'.

Peters' impersonal public world thesis relates to the what is to be learned area of my schema. It is a thesis presenting a conceptual scheme intended to circumscribe

and delineate the contents of the what is to be learned area. This does not entail that everything so delineated ought to be learned; it is the mass of material from which we, as educators, make *selections*. As I have said, the 'world' *requires* 'mentalistic' language and, therefore, on Peters' schema a line ought to be drawn *from* the concept of mind *to* what is to be learned, to take account of this requirement (see *supra*, p. 11). I suggest that Peters' 'world' notion is a *metaphor* and for that reason have not included this influence-line on my own schema.

A COROLLARY OF THE FOUR THESES:

SYNTHESIS

24 *An opposition between progressive/child-centred
and traditional/authoritarian models*

Professor Peters' formulation of the concept of education has had at least one considerable benefit: the opposition between the progressive/child-centred and the traditional/authoritarian models in education is now resolved. This chapter details the nature of the opposition and how Peters' work allows it to terminate.

This synthesis is treated largely in *The Logic of Education* although an earlier formulation occurs in "Education as Initiation." Historically, there has been an opposition between two models of education: the authoritarian (traditional) and the child-centred (progressive). They are treated here in their most modern forms, although no doubt they have existed for centuries and have alternated in prominence during that time. The essence of the synthesis is that if the other theses are adequate, then this historical conflict is now resolved and will henceforth no longer trouble us. The current section is to detail, after Peters, the relevant weaknesses of the two models which has placed them in opposition.

a The 'instrumental/moulding' model

In "Education as Initiation" we find that the authoritarian school of thought builds its theories on what is called the 'utilitarian,' 'instrumental,' or 'moulding' model, in which the mind of the child is treated as some kind of material which can be precisely formed and devoted toward some end (EI, pp. 93-97).

Peters' criticism is that the "instrumental and moulding models erect the necessary moral feature of education into an extrinsic end" (EI, p. 95), viz. the achievement of states of willingness and wittingness in persons. What is neglected by this model is that willingness and wittingness are necessary in *any* educational process and constitute criteria for educational methods.

Regarding these states as ends to be gained is legitimate when students lack a necessary independence, for example, by having learned to submit without question to the decisions of others, or whenever they do not have enough awareness of their own actions to understand what is to be expected of them. While the worth attributed to these states qualifies them as educational achievements they are only a preliminary, to ensure that students are educable (EE, p. 41). Willingness and wittingness are therefore intrinsic and not extrinsic conditions of education. With the instrumental and moulding models there is the risk that *any* method of 'moulding' may be thought

legitimate provided only that the end be desirable, and that, therefore, students may be treated in morally repugnant ways.

Also, by concentrating on means and ends to the exclusion of educational criteria, these models allow reasons to be educated to be reformulated, not in terms of intrinsic worth, but as pragmatic and instrumental for some end other than education. (In this case the weight of decision-making for what is to be taught reverts back to the reasons to be educated area from the what is to be learned area.) We then have replacement of educational priorities based on the intrinsic value of what is to be learned, by personal and social priorities, admitting 'improperly' such 'aims of education' as a more competent work force or a psychologically healthy person. Peters does not argue for or against social or personal priorities *in themselves*, only that they have no necessary connection with education.

Means-end or instrumental analyses provide a morally neutral model for activities, but this neutrality is inappropriate in education (EE, p. 27). Since educational activities produce worth while states by means of worth while means, they are not morally neutral. Means-end models are at best usable in education under strict additional conditions. At worst they foster misunderstanding as to the nature of education by suggesting that educational norms are open to interpretation and adjustment in

a way in which they are not.

b The 'growth' model

Also in "Education as Initiation" we find that the progressive school of thought builds its theories on what is called the 'growth' model, in which the mind of the child is treated as something which unfolds according to its natural or innate propensities--much as an oak tree will mature successfully if given the right sorts of conditions (EI, pp. 93-97).

Peters' criticism is that "the growth model converts a necessary feature of educational processes into a procedural principle" (EI, p. 95), viz. that willingness and wittingness be insisted upon above all else. Such emphasis, especially in conjunction with other (biological) features of the model, may give the impression that students should learn only what they may be 'naturally' interested in, without regard for how they understand what they are doing. The risk entailed is that students will not learn disciplines or what Peters calls 'forms of thought and awareness' together with their relevant standards and precision.

c Analysis of the opposition

The essential difference between the two kinds of model is that while the moulding model concentrates on the end to be realized and therefore on the content that must

be taught, the growth model concentrates on the 'potentialities' within the learner and on the methods of bringing these out. With the current progressive movement in education, the growth theorists attack as morally indefensible the methods of the instrumentalists, suggesting such methods might lead to the stunting or arresting of the child's attempts at self-realization and growth (EI, p. 94). The instrumentalists may well respond that the lack of adherence by the progressivists to those standards the child *must* learn in order to deal with the world as an adult is nothing less than an abdication of the responsibility to educate.

Peters' analysis of the weaknesses of the theories becomes clear: each functions as a corrective for the other, but a synthesis cannot be gained due to mutually incompatible features of the models and to mutual weaknesses also.

The two approaches to education represent,

...two rather extreme polarized conceptions of how content and method can be related for the implementing of educational aims. Neither is adequate in itself, though both emphasize points that need emphasis, in too extreme a way. When comparing authoritarian with child-centred approaches to education it is often said that the former were strong on aims and content but weak on methods, whereas the latter are strong on methods but weak on aims and content. (LE, p. 32)

But a simple integration of the positive features of the two views proves to be inadequate, since,

...they both shared a common weakness--they paid too little attention to *public forms of experience* which, in our view [Peters' and Hirst's], are absolutely central to the development of knowledge and understanding. And an emphasis on forms of experience can provide a much needed synthesis between these two approaches to education....For content is necessary for modes of experience to be acquired, as well as being important in its own right. And without training in public modes of experience the progressive ideals of autonomy, creativeness, and critical thought are empty uplift. (LE, p. 32)

While the authoritarians did emphasize content:

...they regarded this as material to be learnt and believed. They valued obedience more than they valued independence of mind. In their system, therefore, there had been little emphasis on initiating people into the mode of experience or way of thinking by means of which it could also be criticized and adapted to new circumstances. (LE, p. 32)

Thus, unless a synthesis could be attained neither side could achieve its ideals: the progressivists, in de-emphasizing content, lost the chance to develop adults who were cognizant of the state of knowledge and understanding in the world, and so the critical abilities they did develop went to waste due to incompetence; the authoritarians, in de-emphasizing methods, lost the chance to develop adults who were conscious of the dynamic structure of knowledge and understanding, and so the knowledge competency they did develop went to waste due to lack of critical ability. And neither side could recognize the essential objectivity of forms of experience or the difficulty of the development of these forms, and so they would lose sight of the fact that they were preparing *people for the world*.

25 *A synthesis of these models involves the notion of public forms of experience as delineated in thesis four*

In *The Logic of Education* Peters and Hirst propose the following thesis:

In the context of what the authors regard as the outmoded controversy between the authoritarian and child-centred approach to education a synthesis is attempted which is derivative from an analysis of the concepts of 'education' and of 'human development'. (LE, p. 14)

This proposal is "the thesis of this book" (LE, p. 15). I have presented the relevant analysis of education as thesis three (*supra*, ch. 6), and the relevant analysis of human development as thesis two and thesis four (*supra*, chs. 5 and 7 respectively).

Peters and Hirst wish to demonstrate,

...that the notion of public modes of experience can reconcile these two approaches in a way that does justice to the valuative aspects of education and which puts the contrasting emphasis on specialist knowledge and personal development into a proper perspective. (LE, p. 42)

Two chapters of *The Logic of Education* are devoted to this undertaking. The results can be summarized in this section more briefly.

The emphasis on criteria of education allows the content and methods of education to be seen in a non-conflicting context. General human development is similar to what Peters calls education (LE, Ch. 3) but is perhaps less

definite about the knowledge and understanding criteria than is education (LE, p. 57). Personal development presupposes initiation into different modes of experience (LE, p. 55), and takes cognizance of the fact that,

...the manner in which the teacher passes on information and rules...is perpetuated in the manner in which the pupils come to regard them. (ARE, p. 117)

The obedience for obedience's sake dictum of the traditionalists is regarded as pointless and is dropped--social orderliness is required in a classroom, but to train in blind obedience to the rules and information a teacher passes on is to perpetuate a dogmatism. The method for method's sake dictum of the progressivists is seen as inadequate and is dropped--but the insistence that one ought to treat fellow human beings humanely is retained. Method is more closely related to human development and to the ideal conception of a human being which both education and human development presuppose (LE, p. 58).

Resolution of the conflict between the two models is shown:

...if we examine carefully the character of the central objectives sought by progressives, we find that they, as much as those sought by traditionalists, are necessarily related to the acquisition of certain fundamental forms of what we have loosely called public modes of experience, understanding and knowledge. (LE, p. 60)

In conclusion, it is found that when the unwarranted

assertions entailed in the two models are removed, and that when proper emphasis is placed on public forms of experience, and that when human development is more properly understood as an initiation into such forms of experience, that the language of educational concepts reduces to that as presented in Peters' third thesis, and that the third thesis, as presented constitutes a resolution of the old progressive-traditionalist conflict. Education may now be characterized (without fear of misunderstanding) as:

...educational processes are those processes of learning, which may be stimulated by teaching, out of which desirable states of mind, involving knowledge and understanding, develop. (LE, p. 86)

This conflict may be placed within the schema by noting that the authoritarians emphasized what is to be learned--even if their understanding of this area remained problematic--and de-emphasized the ethical elements of teaching theory, and the progressivists emphasized the ethical elements of teaching theory while de-emphasizing what is to be learned. Their adherences to the schema were rather less than Peters'.

The fact that the resolution achieved by Peters follows from the four theses as I have selected them lends support for my selection. The fact that Peters has resolved this long-standing problem by concentrating essentially on the concept of mind, and a combination of reasons to be

educated and what is to be learned and by making deductions from these areas to learning theory and teaching theory, indicates that a close adherence to the schema as I have developed it results in the elimination of misleading concepts and in a more fruitful and comprehensive concept of education in at least one major case.

CONCLUSIONS

26 The status of Peters' concept of education

In outlining the four theses on education of Professor Peters I have attempted to show that his formulations represent a comprehensive concept of education when analyzed according to the schema of five areas I developed in the first part of the thesis. Peters' work is consistent and, except for two minor variations (he draws a connection *from* reasons to be educated *to* concept of mind, and a connection *from* concept of mind *to* what is to be learned) analyzes easily into the schema. In the light of this I regard Peters' concept of education as potentially very fruitful. The resolution of the progressive-traditionalist conflict is indicative of this fruitfulness.

The analysis of Professor Peters' work according to the schema indicates that the schema itself may provide fruitful illumination of complex and so far confusing matters to do with the concept of education. The schema may, of course, be treated in various ways, and it appears that Peters' formulations approximate rather closely to that which arises out of the ordinary language of education.

27 *The status of the schema*

From an initial point in the language of education (reasons to be educated) I find that a working formulation of the concept of education develops until it embodies a broad network of assumptions and assertions encompassing the five general areas. There will be relative stability in this division into five areas because there is relative stability among the conceptual frameworks in the basic areas, in psychology and in sociology for example, and because the language of education seems to divide *naturally* into five relatively isolable areas.

My argument has been that each of the five areas of the schema and also a set of logical connections between the areas ^{is} are required. If any of them is omitted within the context of the schema more or less extensive and damaging changes will occur in the concept of education. I confine myself here to the two 'basic' areas--concept of mind and reasons to be educated.

Omission of the concept of mind area leaves parts of learning theory and parts of teaching theory in a logical vacuum. Gone is the concept of the learner and hence also the logical foundation on which notions of human development are based, insofar as such development requires a theory of the relations between experience, understanding, and mental development. Omission of the reasons to be educated area eliminates the foundation for what is to be learned and

parts of the foundations for teaching theory and learning theory: there would remain no value-directives controlling the way in which educators move their endeavours. Human development on a practical level would take its directives from whatever spiritual, social, economic, political, etc. forces there are dominant. Peters' own analysis of the progressive-traditional conflict indicates what occurs if what is to be learned is de-emphasized (see *supra*, Ch. 8).

I do not insist that educators, to be effective, must have my schema available, but that the closer their own thought *approximates* to that formulated in the schema the more effective they will be. The schema is in a sense a reminder: it allows several complex interrelations among five specified kinds of variables to be kept in mind during educational deliberations and so protects existing insights. Also, by its nature, the schema *excludes* many irrelevant matters from consideration, and so *limits* thought on the concept of education. The schema therefore provides for a clarity and conciseness of thought in education not heretofore achieved.

28 *Further work on the concept of education*

The schema may serve a valuable function as a tool for the analysis of philosophical, theoretical, and practical matters in education. It will, therefore, be of use in the *comparative analysis* of the work of numbers of educational

researchers. The weaknesses and strengths of ideas and programmes can be shown up thereby. Ideas and programmes may be compared; conflicts between schools of thought may be schematized and displayed clearly so that one can determine what is and what is not at stake.

Further work on the concept of education involves the elaboration of the conceptual frameworks of each of the five areas such that they are internally consistent, and such that the five remain consistent *as a system*. Given the schema with its logical interrelations, these individual frameworks will undergo mutual influences so that inconsistencies may be eliminated and insights made available among the logically interrelated areas. This will have the effects that the concept of education will be illuminated more broadly than it is at present: inadequacies at practical and theoretical levels may be discovered with relative ease; new programmes and ideas, once seen within the schema, will assume a perspective which ought to indicate accurately their potential; ideas arising out of the schema itself (depending for example, on revisions of what is to be learned in the light of clearer assessments of reasons to be educated), and which are thus in a class not before readily available, may suggest entirely new educational programmes.

Such additional illumination and assessment, as exemplified, for example, in Peters' work, even now suffices to resolve some existing theoretical conflicts in education.

Without such a schema of five areas and of the logical relations among them, educational insights must remain limited to the extent that these considerations are 'hit on' or 'missed'--perhaps arbitrarily, and the resolution of many practical educational problems will very likely remain impossible.

WORKS CONSULTED

General

- Bennett, Jonathan. *Rationality: An Essay Towards an Analysis*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964
- Goodman, Nelson. *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*. 2nd ed. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. Intro by Bertrand Russell. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961 [1921].

Works by R. S. Peters

I have not referred directly to all of Peters' works in the philosophy of education during the writing of the thesis, but all have influenced the writing. I give a complete list of his works in the field partly for this reason and partly to assist the reader who may wish to study his work. Some of his extended works contain abbreviations and/or amplifications of previously published papers, and it will save the reader time locating relatively obscure works which may be more easily accessible in other forms.

"Aims of Education--A Conceptual Inquiry" *Philosophy and Education: Proceedings of the International Seminar, Mar. 23-25, 1966*. Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Monograph Series #3, 1967, pp. 1-32. Criticism by Professors Woods and Dray and a reply by Peters accompany this paper.

with A. P. Griffiths. "The Autonomy of Prudence". *Mind*, Vol. LXXI, No. 282 (Apr. 1962), pp. 161-180. This paper is regarded by Peters as a "jumping off place" for "Worth-while Activities" in *Ethics and Education* (EE, p. 8).

Authority Responsibility and Education. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959. This book contains the paper "Must an Educator Have an Aim?" (Ch. 7)

"In Defence of Bingo: A Rejoinder". *Brit. J. Ed. Stud.*, Vol. XV, No. 2 (June, 1967), pp. 188-194. This paper is a response to a paper by P. S. Wilson "In Defence of Bingo" which appeared in *Brit. J. Ed. Stud.* Vol. XV, No. 1 (Feb, 1967), pp. 5-27. Wilson's paper was a response to "Worth-while Activities."

The Concept of Motivation. 2nd ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960.

Ethics and Education. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966. Chapter V is the paper "Worth-while Activities". (NB. The works EI, EP, EE (Ch. 1), and AE are very similar in structure. The arguments on the concept of education are in general the same, and occasional sentences are carried from one work to another.)

"Education and the Educated Man: Some Further Reflections". *The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, Proceedings of the Annual Conference, Jan. 1970*. Vol. IV, 1970. pp. 5-20. This is, alongside EI, EP, EE, and AE, Peters' most important work in establishing the concept of education.

Education as Initiation: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at the University of London Institute of Education 9 December 1963. London: The University of London Institute of Education, 1964. This is the *Inaugural Lecture* referred to in EP, p. 1.

"Education as Initiation". *Philosophical Analysis and Education*. Ed. R. D. Archambault. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1965. pp. 87-111. This paper differs from the earlier *Education as Initiation...* in that four introductory paragraphs have been dropped. Some of the deleted material related to ceremonies of inauguration.

"What is an Educational Process?" *The Concept of Education*. Ed. R. S. Peters. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967. pp. 1-23

"Education and Human Development". *Melbourne Studies in Education*, 1970. Ed. R. J. W. Selleck. Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 1970. pp. 83-103. (NB. see reference in *The Logic of Education, infra.*)

with P. H. Hirst. *The Logic of Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. Of the seven chapters, two are abbreviations of other papers, and another contains an abbreviated paper as well as other material. Sections (1) ("The Concept of 'Education'") and (2) ("Aims of Education") are on issues which Peters claims are more fully discussed in *Ethics and Education*, Ch. 1, and *Education and the Development of Reason*. Ed. Dearden, Hirst, and Peters (in preparation). Section (1) is an abbreviation of "Education and the Educated Man" (LE, p. 133). Chapter 3 "introduces in a simplified form most of the issues discussed in more detail in" *Education and the Development of Reason* (LE, p. 134). Chapter 3 is an abbreviated version of "Education and Human Development", and Chapter 4 is an abbreviated version of "Teaching and Personal Relationships" (LE, p. x). Neither piece is greatly abbreviated. The final chapter "goes over again, in a greatly abbreviated form much of the ground covered in the latter part of...*Ethics and Education*...which dealt with concepts such as 'freedom', 'authority', 'discipline', 'punishment', and 'democracy'...." (LE, p. 137).

"Must an Educator Have an Aim?" (See *Authority Responsibility and Education.*)

"Moral Education and the Psychology of Character". *Philosophy*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 139 (Jan. 1962). pp. 37-56. Reprinted in *Philosophy and Education: Modern Readings*. Ed. I. Scheffler. 2nd ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966, pp. 263-286. My references to this paper are to the Scheffler reprint.

"Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education". Scheffler, pp. 245-262.

"'A Recognizable Philosophy of Education': A Constructive Critique". *Perspectives on Plowden*. Ed. R. S. Peters. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 1-20. This book was meant as a critique of the British Plowden Report on Education.

"Teaching and Personal Relationships". *Melbourne Studies*, pp. 104-122. (NB. See reference in *The Logic of Education, supra.*)

"Worth-while Activities" (See *Ethics and Education*)